Editing Mao Zedong (section)

==== The Cultural Revolution ====
The movement that became known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represented an attempt by Mao to go beyond the party rectification campaigns—of which there had been many since 1942—and to devise a new and more radical method for dealing with what he saw as the bureaucratic degeneration of the party. It also represented, beyond any doubt or question, however, a deliberate effort to eliminate those in the leadership who, over the years, had dared to cross him. The victims, from throughout the party hierarchy, suffered more than mere political disgrace. All were publicly humiliated and detained for varying periods, sometimes under very harsh conditions; many were beaten and tortured, and not a few were killed or driven to suicide. Among the casualties was Liu, who died because he was denied proper medical attention.

The justification for those sacrifices was defined in a key slogan of the time: “Fight selfishness, criticize revisionism.” When the young Chinese known as the [[Red Guards]], who constituted the first shock troops of Mao’s enterprise, burst onto the scene in the summer of 1966 with their battle cry “To rebel is justified!”<ref name = cr>[https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-explainer.html China’s Cultural Revolution, Explained], ''The New York Times''</ref>. It seemed for a time that not only the power of the party cadres but also authority in all its forms was being questioned. It soon became evident that Mao, who in 1956 had justified decentralization as a means to building a “strong socialist state,” still believed in the need for state power. When the Shanghai leftists Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan—who were later to make up half the Gang of Four—came to see him in February 1967, immediately after setting up the Shanghai Commune, Mao asserted that the demand for the abolition of “heads” (leaders), which had been heard in their city, was “extreme anarchism” and “most reactionary”; in fact, he stated, there would “always be heads.” Communes, he added, were “too weak when it came to suppressing counterrevolution” and in any case required party leadership. He therefore ordered them to dissolve theirs and to replace it with a “revolutionary committee.”

Those committees, based on an alliance of former party cadres, young activists, and representatives of the People’s Liberation Army, were to remain in place until two years after Mao’s death. At first they were largely controlled by the army. The Ninth Congress of 1969 initiated the process of rebuilding the party; and the death of Lin Biao in 1971 diminished, though it by no means eliminated, the army’s role. Thereafter it seemed briefly, in 1971–72, that a compromise, of which [[Zhou Enlai]] was the architect, might produce some kind of synthesis between the values of the Cultural Revolution and the pre-1966 political and economic order.

He was one of the main supporters of [[Pol Pot]] and his [[Khmer Rouge]] during the Cambodian Civil War. Upon the Khmer Rouge taking power in 1975, Pol Pot largely based his "Year Zero" policies on Mao's Cultural Revolution, which would ultimately result in the [[Cambodian Genocide]]. Mao would serve as the Khmer Rouge's primary supporter during their years in power, after Vietnam distanced themselves from the regime.<ref>[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-chinese-communist-partys-relationship-the-khmer-rouge-the-1970s-ideological-victory The Chinese Communist Party’s Relationship with the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s: An Ideological Victory and a Strategic Failure], Wilson Center</ref> He also was a strong ally of [[Ho Chi Minh]] (and later [[Le Duan]]) during the [[Vietnam War]].<ref>[https://hanoitimes.vn/chinese-personalities-honored-for-support-to-vietnam-327705.html Chinese personalities honored for support to Vietnam], ''Hanoi Times''</ref> 

Even before Zhou’s death in January 1976, however, that compromise had been overturned. All recognition by Mao of the importance of professional skills was swallowed up in an orgy of political rhetoric, and all things foreign were regarded as counterrevolutionary. Mao’s last decade, which had opened with manifestos in favour of the Paris Commune model of mass democracy, closed with paeans of praise to that most implacable of centralizing despots, Shihuangdi, the first emperor of the ancient Qin dynasty.